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CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIETY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES |
INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS:
The Perspective of a Small State
Ambassador Martin Palous,
Embassy of the Czech Republic, Washington, DC
(Presented at the Meeting of the
Washington DC Chapter, May21, 2002)
In what ways are international affairs seen differently by small and large democratic
nations? Obviously, such a question can be more difficult to answer in the post-September
11th context. We all see the common threat to the freedom of our. increasingly
interconnected and interdependent world, and we all wish to cooperate in the cause of the
struggle against international terrorism. At the same time, however, we should not forget
that despite the common goals that lay ahead and the common values that make us all part
of one civilization, small nations have their own heritage, their own experiences (both
personal and with the surrounding world), their own questions and discussions, and their
own perspectives. As an illuminating example of the species of small nations, I would like
to introduce the case of my own country, the Czech Republic.
There are two sets of problems that should be articulated in the context of the Czech
Republic. First, there is the question paraphrasing the efforts to understand a democratic
society undertaken almost one hundred and eighty years ago here in the United States by
Alexis de Tocqueville: What is democracy in Central Europe, and what is democracy in the
Czech Republic? Modem Czechs and Americans share the same basic democratic values and
ideas; but what are the differences, if any, between their political cultures, national
identities, and political habits? And second, how do these factors influence the behavior
of democracies in the international arena? American national interests are defined and
formulated within the never-ending dialogue of their politicians, public intellectuals,
journalists, pundits and experts of all kinds and colors, and we certainly follow their
debates and eventual clashes over relevant issues very attentively. But what about our
Central European climate of ideas? What about the national interests of small nations like
the Czech Republic? We certainly can point to many things we have in common with America,
but should we not try to better understand the sources, be they historical, cultural or
political, of our eventual differences? And should we not do that -- not to weaken the
transatlantic bond between Europe and America, but rather to strengthen our capacity for
mutual understanding and cooperation?
Let me start with the first question. The modem Czech nation emerged in the second half of
the eighteenth century, i.e., during the European equivalent
of history when the American "founding fathers" were pursuing their own cause on
the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Nonetheless, it is crucially important to realize
that the story of Czech "national revival" was inspired and set in motion by
ideas and aspirations that were quite far from the spirit of the American Revolution. In
my view, it was Jan Patocka (after Masaryk, he was undoubtedly the most influential Czech
philosopher and political thinker of the Twentieth Century), who outlined the still
unsurpassed analysis of the origins of our modern national identity in his relatively
short book (originally written in German as a series of letters to his German friend in
the beginning of the 1970"s and published only after the Velvet Revolution),
"Was sind die Tchechen" ("Who are the Czechs"). The center of
Patocka"s efforts to offer his reader "a concise overview of I~acts and an
attempt at explanation" is the thesis that an insurmountable
gap in Czech history exists, separating its older, medieval phase (formed by the glorious
deeds of mighty Czech kings, whose traces and reflections can still be seen in the
beautiful architecture of Prague and other Central European historical cities and towns)
from our presence (when historians desperately attempted to bridge this gap with the help
of their conceptions of national history and corresponding historiographies); that the
modern Czech nation was "reborn" overwhelmingly "from below" and that
its is exactly this origin, one might even say our "genetic disposition," that
constitutes our endemic political problem in the modern era: the Czech
"smallness."
The principal source of Czech democracy and the factor decisively influencing Czech modern
politics and political culture, from their origins in the late
eighteenth century and up to their present forms and habits, is, according to Patocka, the
structure and composition of Czech society. Being "reborn from
below" means that for historical reasons, Czechs lacked the aristocratic element
(which was largely present and active in the Polish or Hungarian stories of modernization
and subsequent political emancipation); that among the dominant players decisively
influencing the Czech political environment, one can rather find individuals from the
middle or even lower strata of society to be modernized, i.e. awakened, enlightened and
educated: teachers, writers and poets, journalists, priests, university professors and
playwrights. Looking at how the whole process of reawakening began and contrasting what
can be characterized as "Czech-style-modernization" with other, definitely more
glorious and more visible forms of the similar process, Patocka had to say in his piece:
"The Czechs are a nation of liberated servants. They did not liberate themselves.
They did not carry out any great revolution such as that which brought the great American
republic into existence. Nor did they experience anything similar to the French Revolution
Rather, they were liberated by an act of emperor"
I-laving said that, however, Patocka at the same time admits that it is exactly the
"reĀbirth" of Czechs "from below" that makes them -- as a modem
political nation, formulating and pursuing its political program with the central aim of
political emancipation -- naturally democratic. And he also admits that in comparison with
others, the Czech achievements in the process of modernization were quite impressive. The
main feature of the Czech national behavior was a patient but steady progress in the
building of a civil society. Throughout the nineteenth century, this idea was captured by
the term drobecova politika, which could be translated as "small aims, small
gains," with the word "small" understood as a gradual and evolutionary
development. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the Czech lands were a
developed industrial society with a quite impressive educational system and an active
associational life. Czech politicians traditionally had all sorts of complaints as far as
the centralist policies of the government in Vienna, or the sometimes more and sometimes
less oppressive strategies as far as the Austrian secret police were concerned, but among
themselves they certainly got used to and were enjoying their own kind of
"democracy."
The democratic spirit, which found undoubtedly strong roots in the modern Czech nation,
precisely because of her "rebirth from below," had not only its advantages, but
also its weaknesses. Czech smallness, as far as its aims and gains (Patocka emphasizes
thar "smalness" here does not only describe the
lack of resources and the disadvantage that results from small numbers, but a kind of
"quality," substantively influencing political behavior), is always threatened
by its own tendency towards closed-ness, parochialism, opportunism, lack of confidence,
and at the same time its permanent need for self-excuse and sel&defense. The spirit of
"liberated servants" was not only wonderfully democratic, hut was also
periodically troubled within the Czech national political life, generating controversies
or even crises. As "smallness" represents an inherent feature of modern Czech
polities, there always have been outstanding individuals, both politicians and political
thinkers, who have desperately tried to open the windows to the outside world and invite a
fresh breeze into the somewhat airless environment and generate alternatives. Czech
smallness, Patocka states emphatically, required a dose of greatness or worldliness, if
those who were born from below wanted to succeed and bring their project of national
revival to completion. I have no space here to illustrate my point in detail, so I will
end my sketchy characterization of Czech democracy here. The fact that many Czechs were
reaching out from their small world throughout the nineteenth century, and particularly
the fact that many of them moved to America, was for sure very helpful in making the Czech
question more worldly. However, if I were to single out one person who devoted his entire
life to shaking the modem Czechs out of their "shells," I would have to mention
the name of Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, a university professor who got involved in all of the
major political debates of his time; a man who exhorted Czechs to think about
themselves, their politics, and their national identity in "worldly terms;" who
spoke openly against the fabricated Czech mythologies and false self-illusions; who
strongly defended the rights of women and struggled against anti- Semitism; who married an
American and had strong personal, academic and political ties with the United States, and
who, in the end, became the first president of the Czechoslovak State.
II
The significance of Masaryk"s contribution to the evolution of modern Czech democracy
is indisputable, but the very fact that Masaryk was the first president of the independent
Czechoslovak State gives us a good opportunity to move from the domestic to the
international perspective. Thanks to him and to his understanding of both the significance
and the revolutionary character of the "Great War" of 1914-1918, as well as to
his "foreign action" during the war years, the generally accepted creed of
generations of our politicians, according to which Czech "national interests"
were best served within the Austrian Empire, was replaced by a clear and uncompromising
drive for independence. The creation of the state of Czechoslovakia was perceived as the
completion of the national emancipation process, as the definitive end of the so-called
"dark ages" of enslavement under foreign rule, which had lasted for three
hundred years. The role of the United States in this process was indisputable -- Masaryk
worked closely with president Wilson during the war, and Wilson"s idealistic vision
of the postwar world, which should have been "safe for democracy," heavily
influenced the beliefs underlying the foreign policies of the emerging democratic
Czechoslovak State. "The history of Europe since the eighteenth century, "wrote
Masaryk in a seminal essay that precisely reflected the dominant and unambiguously
optimistic spirit of the time, "proves that given their democratic freedom. small
peoples can gain independence. The world war was the climax of the movement begun by the
French revolution, a movement that liberated one oppressed nation after another And now
there is a chance for a democratic Europe and for freedom and omnipotence of all
nations." (New Europe). [he quoted text nicely demonstrates two things that later
became the basis of the foreign political doctrine of Czechoslovakia between the two world
wars. First, the Czechoslovak "founding father" was clearly aware of how much
the success of the political body he had created depended on the international environment
in which this body was to operate. Second, Masaryk spoke here as a staunch believer in the
progress and the power of enlightened reason, as a disseminator of the dogma that might
have been true in the "golden age" of
Europe in the nineteenth century -- in the history understood as the "movement begun
by the French Revolution" -- that, however, turned out to be a sheer illusion in the
coming twentieth century, in the era of totalitarianism and the "crisis of European
civilization."
This short century, the age of extremes (to borrow the title from the famous book by Erich
I-Iobsbawm), gave us and other Central European nations a harsh
lesson in political realism. Democracy in Czechoslovakia was defeated twice, first when
the Masaryk state became a victim of aggression at the hands of
Nazi Germany, and then again when Stalin"s Soviet Union got the green light after
World War II to gain influence in Central Europe and forcibly lead her nations on the path
to building communism. Whereas the beginning of the Twentieth century was marked by
Masaryk"s historical optimism as far as the future of his nation and the whole region
was concerned, by 1984 Milan Kundera, in reaction to what had happened during its course,
commented on Central Europe"s in the Twentieth Century as a "tragedy":
"Central Europe, as" a family of small nations, has its own vision of the world,
a vision of deep mistrust of history. . . history, that goddess of Hegel and Marx, that
incarnation of reason that judges us and arbitrates our fate, that is the history of
conquerors. The peoples of Central Europe are not conquerors They cannot be separated from
European history They cannot exist outside of it. But they represent the wrong side of
history. They are its victims and outsiders." (Tragedy of Central Europe)
Kundera"s epitaph itself had a strange fate, because at the moment that it was
pronounced, Central Europe was preparing herself, with Poland"s Solidarnosez and
Czechoslovakia's Charter 77 and other dissident initiatives, for her miraculous
"resurrection." However Kundera did make a very good point " did the small
Central European nations have a chance to decide about or at least to influence their own
situation when confronted with greater political powers, momentarily shaping not only the
political map of the whole continent, but seemingly dictating the course of human history?
Could they escape, or at least partially change their lot if they had behaved differently
when they found themselves on various political crossroads? Or rather, was it the lack of
political realism, an evident shortcoming seriously weakening the otherwise strong
political vision of Masaryk (which, by the way, was shared by the presiding President of
the United States)? Was it, on the contrary, too much of the opportunism and parochial
indecisiveness inherent in the endemic Czech "smallness" that Masaryk had
struggled with, that must be identified as the main reason for our past political failures
and fallacies? What lessons are Czechs advised to draw for their future political behavior
and decision-making, based on the Munich treason of 1938, the Communist coup d"etat
in 1948, or the failed Prague Spring of 1968?
The collapse of communism in 1989, the annus mirabilis, ended the short twentieth century
and offered Czechs and other Central Europeans the chance to try again. For almost 13
years now, we have been busy not only with our transition from socialism, our building of
a democracy and a free market economy, but also with our participation in the formation of
a new political architecture. What we sue when we look back and judge our achievements and
shortcomings is perhaps a bumpy road, yet nonetheless, optimism can still prevail in our
post-communist world. In spite of all the difficulties (even in spite of such enormous
tragedies that have come to pass, such as in the former Yugoslavia), one simply cannot
deny that things are really changing for the better. The Czech Republic, together with
Hungary and Poland, are, since 1999, new members of NATO - there is even a realistic
chance that in the fall of this year, the Prague NATO summit will invite another seven
countries to join. The European Union will also be enlarged in the foreseeable future, and
thus we can expect that though we once found ourselves on the wrong side of the barricade
in the division of Europe, that too will soon be over. The shadows of the past are simply
fading away, and the new threats that the free world is confronted with in the beginning
of the 21st century - threats which have become especially visible after the enormous
tragedy of September II of last year " do not seem to open a new gap or do not seem
to build a new wall to again separate us from our natural
partners, from those with whom we share the same values of civilization.
Having said that, however, I would conclude anyway that we should not
forget our unique history, we should not stop asking questions as to why we failed
to protect our interests and to defend our freedom in the last century. On the contrary,
we should remain open and vigilant as far as our past is concerned, we should be aware of
the fragility and vulnerability of our region, and we should prepare to carry the burden
of common responsibility. We will never escape the smallness factor, certainly it could
once again become our weakness, the proverbial Achilles heel of Central Europe. But it oes
not need to be so -- if used properly and creatively, our smallness may become a smart
weapon contributing significantly to the struggle otherwise dominated by greater players,
the struggle against the unprecedented evil which in the dawn of a new era assailed not
only the United States, but the whole of civilized humanity.
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